In a highly anticipated geopolitical encounter, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are set to meet in South Korea on Thursday, October 30, on the eve of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. This bilateral meeting is expected to send far greater reverberations across the global stage than the gatherings of other world leaders attending the APEC forum, which officially opens on Friday. As leaders of the world’s two largest economies and most powerful nations, both Trump and Xi come to the table eager to project an image of unyielding resolve and strategic foresight to their respective domestic audiences. With tariffs and sanctions having inflicted significant economic pain on both sides, there is a distinct possibility that common ground, or at least a temporary truce, could be found on pressing economic issues.
The discussions between these two titans in Gyeongju, the host city for the APEC summit, are drawing intense global scrutiny for a multitude of reasons. This marks their first direct engagement since President Trump’s return to the White House, occurring under a fundamentally recalibrated and significantly more strained international environment. Relations between Washington and Beijing have deteriorated markedly, fueled by an escalating tariff war, mounting tensions over Taiwan, and differing stances on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Many observers are keen to see if President Trump will confront Xi Jinping regarding China’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil, an issue Trump himself publicly hinted he might address. However, a chorus of skeptical voices in the U.S., including Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, casts doubt on Trump’s ability to sway Xi. Krugman argues that Trump’s policies, characterized by strained relations with traditional American allies and a disruption of the global trading system, have left the U.S. in a comparatively weaker position, suggesting that “America will lose” in such an encounter.
Conversely, Beijing does not share such categorical pessimism. Preparing for what it views as a long-term strategic duel with Washington, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee recently reaffirmed its commitment to doubling down on industrial and technological development. This strategic pivot, aimed at bolstering China’s self-reliance, inevitably leads to heightened competition for many of China’s trading partners, who find themselves facing robust challenges from Chinese manufacturers in both their domestic and international markets.
Beijing appears undeterred by external pressure, finding historical inspiration in its strategic approach. President Xi Jinping, in particular, looks to the figure of Lin Zexu, a high-ranking official of the Qing Empire who, in the first half of the 19th century, courageously confronted the then-mighty British Empire. This episode, etched into the collective memory of the Chinese nation, recounts how British merchants, representing the global superpower of the era, inundated Chinese ports with opium. Lin Zexu, acting as the emperor’s plenipotentiary, decisively banned the illicit trade. Britain’s military response, however, overwhelmed China, leading to a humiliating defeat and the cession of Hong Kong to London under the terms of a subsequent peace treaty.
The First Opium War, as taught in Chinese textbooks and widely discussed in the media today, is recognized as the genesis of China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western powers, Japan, and Russia. Since assuming leadership in 2012, Xi Jinping has consistently articulated the imperative to erase this painful historical stain. According to The New York Times, this historical burden looms large over Xi as he prepares for his discussions with President Trump. For the Chinese leader, this summit transcends mere disputes over tariffs or rare earth metals. Julia Lovell, a sinologist at the University of London and author of a book on the Opium Wars, notes a fundamental divergence in perspective: Trump perceives China as ascendant in the contest for a new global order, while Xi views China as a historical victim of that very order. This makes for an inherently complex and challenging negotiation.
Lovell emphasizes the importance of understanding the profound impact of 19th-century history on contemporary Chinese sentiment. For Xi, the legacy of the Qing dynasty official serves a dual lesson: first, China must never again succumb to foreign pressure, and second, it must never negotiate from a position of weakness. While Lin Zexu is revered as a courageous figure, his bravery alone proved insufficient against the technologically superior Western powers of his time. Xi’s overarching strategy, therefore, is to cultivate an unparalleled national strength—militarily and economically—that enables China to engage the United States as an equal peer. This drive for power was vividly showcased last month during a massive military parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan, where Xi declared an end to China’s era of humiliating defeats by foreign aggressors.
Further complicating the bilateral dialogue is a contentious issue that has stirred deep resentment in Beijing. American politicians, including President Trump, have drawn parallels between China’s current role and Britain’s 19th-century opium trade. They accuse China of exacerbating America’s drug crisis by exporting precursor chemicals used in the production of fentanyl. Trump specifically stated last week that this would be the first point of discussion with Xi. Beijing, conversely, views these accusations as an attempt by Washington to politically blackmail China using the drug problem.
Echoes of the 19th century also resonate in the contemporary trade imbalances. Then, as now, a major source of friction between Western nations and China was the sheer volume of Chinese exports—tea, medicinal herbs, porcelain, silk—with minimal imports, creating a massive trade surplus for China. Today, similar imbalances and disputes continue to strain relations.
Finally, Reuters recently reported a stark reminder from a Chinese government official: Beijing “absolutely does not rule out the use of force” for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. While this stance is not new, formalized by China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, the timing of this reiteration, just ahead of the high-stakes summit, is pointed. It serves as a direct message to Washington, which continues to supply Taiwan with advanced weaponry and military advisors, underscoring the enduring volatility of the Taiwan Strait issue as a potential flashpoint in U.S.-China relations.