The second Central Asia–China Summit will be held in Astana in June. In preparation for the meeting in Astana, the media has already started publishing information about the upcoming major event. There is no detailed information yet, most likely due to the fact that countries do not advertise the issues they will address at the summit. Nevertheless, the formation of the agenda at the level of deputy foreign ministers has already begun, many issues will be raised, and multilateral and bilateral meetings will be intense, and that’s why.
First and foremost, at the first summit in Xi’an, China, in 2023, participants discussed not only 54 major initiatives and created 19 platforms for cooperation, but also changed the format of meetings. Starting from Astana, China and its Central Asian partners will meet alternately in the capitals of the republics every two years. The second and also important thing is that at the summit there was a clear division of the issues discussed into political, economic and social (see NG dated 04/27/25). The political goals include preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian countries, strengthening the rule of law and security in the region, as well as preventing external interference that could trigger “color revolutions.” Regarding economic issues, the summit participants will consider the state and possibilities of diversifying trade and economic ties, the volume of trade turnover, attracting investments and partnerships in key sectors of the economy. The Presidents will also touch upon social issues: education, science, culture, tourism, media and sports.
The States of the region have no questions about any of the political tasks. China has no questions either, because it is clear that cooperation can only develop in conditions of stability. China plays an important role in the security of the region, especially in the fight against terrorism and extremism, while primarily pointing to internal problems. It is significant that back in mid-2023, Zhao Huasheng, a professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, noted in one of his articles for the Valdai Club that the barrier against external dangers should be built primarily within countries. Therefore, information exchange and joint anti-terrorism exercises of the Central Asian countries can contribute to achieving stability and sustainable development.
The region is concerned about the ecology of the territory of the lost Aral Sea, as well as land degradation and desertification. Among the major economic problems of the Caspian littoral countries is the lowering of the Caspian Sea level, which threatens the maritime infrastructure of the city of Turkmenbashi and affects other participants of the summit. The reasons for the shallowing of the Caspian Sea, which are not fully understood, have a serious impact on the formation of interstate routes, in particular the Trans–Caspian Transport Route, a corridor running from China through Kazakhstan to the countries of the South Caucasus and further to Turkey and Europe. This situation forces Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to introduce adjustments to the supply of goods and to the planned routes.
More than 10 years ago, four Central Asian countries began construction of the 4th pipeline D, the route of which is laid from the Turkmen Galkynysh field to Uzbekistan and further through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Western China. If the gas pipeline is real money for transit countries, then for Turkmenistan it is not only an increase in budget revenues, but also a diversification of supplies. However, there is a certain nuance here – with the development of electricity from renewable sources in 15-20 years, it may turn out that the consumption of natural gas in the world will decrease, and consumers in China will not have to pay for hydrocarbons burned in thermal power plants.
All Central Asian countries, without exception, are experiencing some kind of problems in the field of electricity generation, in which China can transfer its advanced technologies and equipment in the field of solar and wind energy to its partners. To this end, China may consider proposals from Central Asian countries for concessional financing of electricity generation from renewable sources.
All countries in the region are interested in obtaining loans for the mining industry. In this industry, foreign investors have begun to realize that in addition to gas, gold, silver, antimony, uranium, rare metals and rare earths can be successfully mined in the Central Asian republics. An example is the northern slopes of the Kuramin Range in Uzbekistan, where a large center for the extraction and processing of minerals needed by China is being created near Tashkent, and loans are needed for this. It is expected that Chinese companies Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry and Zijin Mining Group will create joint ventures in Kazakhstan for the production of steel and the extraction of rare earth metals.
According to Kazakh statistics, up to half of the most popular cars in Kazakhstan in the first quarter of 2025 were sold by Chinese cars. Imports of Chinese automotive and construction equipment are also growing in other Central Asian countries. With this in mind, China will be able to place factories for the production of Chery, Haval, and Changan cars in the region based on nodal assembly and screwdriver technologies.
The construction of warehouses, logistics centers and terminals remains an acute problem in all Central Asian countries. The summit participants will discuss the construction and reconstruction of highways, as well as the creation of transport hubs near railway tracks. In particular, one of such highways in Tajikistan is the Dushanbe–Kulma highway, which connects the republic with China. At the end of 2024, construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with a length of 532 km started through the Kyrgyz cities of Torugart, Makmal and Jalal-Abad to Uzbek Andijan. By 2030, 20 railway stations, 48 bridges and 27 tunnels with a length of 103 km will be built on the highway.
Following the global trend of shifting production to countries with cheap labor, China is expected to relocate several dozen enterprises to Kazakhstan (see NG dated 05/11/25), which were announced 8 years ago. Naturally, the placement of new Chinese production facilities by the local population may be perceived ambiguously, however, new jobs have been created at a number of already built plants and mostly citizens of Kazakhstan work. And, if Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia today is limited only to leasing the Baikonur cosmodrome, Chinese-Kazakh cooperation will develop until 2035 in the construction and operation of a scientific station on the Moon, as well as in conducting a number of scientific research in space.
Of course, by dealing with post-Soviet Central Asia, China will not only invest significant resources in the region and sign the Astana Declaration, but will also gain a significant foothold in the region, increasing the role of the SCO. Having taken a leading position in key areas of trade with the countries of Central Asia, China will step up efforts in all areas to ensure the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Speaking at the first Xi’an summit in 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China intends to modernize the countries of the region and can provide them with about $ 4 billion in financial support. Thus, there will be many proposals for the volume of loans and for a variety of joint projects. But it is absolutely clear that the opening of credit lines to countries by China and the allocation of grants will take place in a dosed manner, according to needs. And this process will be carefully monitored.